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Abstract
Patient mobility is a key issue in the EU who recently passed a new law on patientsright to
EU-wide provider choice. In this paper we use a Hotelling model with two regions that di¤er in
technology to study the impact of patient mobility on health care quality, health care nancing
and welfare. A decentralised solution without patient mobility leads to too low (high) quality and
too few (many) patients being treated in the high-skill (low-skill) region. A centralised solution
with patient mobility implements the rst best, but the low-skill region would not be willing to
transfer authority as its welfare is lower than without mobility. In a decentralised solution, the
e¤ects of patient mobility depend on the transfer payment. If the payment is below marginal
cost, mobility leads to a race-to-the-bottomin quality and lower welfare in both regions. If the
payment is equal to marginal cost, quality and welfare remain unchanged in the high-skill region,
but the low-skill region benets. For a socially optimal payment, which is higher than marginal
cost, quality levels in the two regions are closer to (but not at) the rst best, but welfare is lower
in the low-skill region. Thus, patient mobility can have adverse e¤ects on quality provision and
welfare unless an appropriate transfer payment scheme is implemented.
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1 Introduction
Cross-border patient mobility is a key issue in the European Union at the moment. Despite the fact
that patients in EU member states are allowed to seek health care in other EU countries, patient
mobility is still very low, especially for planned health care treatments.1 A natural explanation for
low mobility is that patients prefer to be treated in their home country. However, there might be
other causes. Patients might be denied access and/or reimbursement if they demand treatment in
a foreign EU country.2 In March 2011 the EU council passed a new law that gives citizens in EU
countries the right to choose among health care providers across all EU member states.3 The new
law intends to limit the scope for EU countries (or providers within EU countries) to deny foreign
EU citizens access to their health care provision. The law also explicitly states that EU countries
cannot refuse to reimburse patients who seek cross-border medical treatment when this treatment
is covered in their home country.4 Thus, by lowering important barriers for patients seeking care in
another EU country, the new law is likely to stimulate patient mobility across EU member states.
In this paper we ask whether patient mobility is desirable or not from a welfare perspective.
Clearly, the answer to this question relies on what are the e¤ects of patient mobility on the provision
and nancing of health care within each country, which is what we will study in detail. While our
paper is motivated by the on-going debate and the new legislation in the EU on cross-border medical
treatment, our analysis also applies to patient mobility within country borders, where regions are
separate jurisdictions. For example, Sweden has a decentralised health care system, which is nanced
primarily through taxes levied by county councils and municipalities. County councils also regulate
the level of service o¤ered by the providers. In 2003 a free choice reformwas implemented, which
allows patients to apply for health care outside their home county, though needing to pay out-of-
1According to the EU Commission (2006) the demand for cross-border health care represents only around 1% of
public spending on health care, which is currently around e10 billion. This estimate includes cross-border health care
which patients had not planned in advance (such as emergency care), which means less than 1% of the expenditure and
movement of patients is for planned cross-border health care, like hip and knee operations or cataract surgery.
2Several EU Court cases illustrate the problem where patients are refused reimbursement by the home country
for cross-border treatment; see, e.g., Case C-158/96 [Kohll, 1998], Case C-120/95 [Decker, 1998] and Case C-372/04
[Watts, 2006]. Although the EU Court decided in favour of the patients, it is still likely that patients face uncertainty
and costs related to reimbursement for cross-border treatment. See, e.g., the EU commision (2006) for a discussion of
these cases.
3Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the application of
patientsrights in cross-border healthcare.
4The EU directive (chapter III) denes some basic principles for the cross-border reimbursement, but is not very
specic on the transfer payments across the member states and the reimbursement to patients seeking cross-border
care. Thus, the EU member states have some discretion in designing the reimbursement rules.
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pocket for the extra travel costs. The home county would need to compensate the county providing
the treatment to their residents. Similarly, in Italy each Region is responsible for the provision of
health care. However, many patients seek care in a di¤erent Region from the one where they reside
and a system of transfers is in place: importingRegions are compensated on the basis of the number
of patients treated from the exportingones. In Canada, Provinces are responsible for the provision
of health care. Mobility across Provinces is generally limited to emergency and sudden illness or
allowed only in special circumstances (for example a specialised treatment not o¤ered in a Province)
under prior approval.
Relatively little is known and understood about patient mobility and its consequences for health
care provision, health care nancing and regional and global (inter-regional) welfare. We aim to
contribute towards lling this gap in the literature. In order to analyse patient mobility across
separate jurisdictions, we make use of a Hotelling model with two regions. Health care is nanced
through income taxation. Patients receive care for free at the point of consumption, but face the cost
of travelling to the provider for treatment. The policy makers in each region decide on the quality
of health care provision in their region and the corresponding tax rate to nance their health care
expenditures. The regions are identical except for their technology in providing health care quality,
e.g., due to access to more skilled doctors, better medical technology, better facilities, etc. All else
equal, the high-skill region will o¤er higher health care quality than the low-skill region. This is the
source of patient mobility in our model.
The objective of our study is twofold. First, we compare the decentralised system with no mobility
(for example the old system within the EU) with a centralised one. We show that a centralised solution
implements the rst best. Although we do not envisage the EU taking over the funding of health
care systems directly, the centralised solution remains a useful benchmark as total welfare is highest
under this solution: it coincides with the rst best. Second, and most importantly, we compare the
decentralised system with no mobility (again the old system within the EU) with a decentralised
system where mobility is allowed and (potentially) a system of transfers can be put in place (the new
system within the EU).
Centralisation versus decentralisation with no mobility. Compared to a decentralised system with
no mobility, a centralised provision of quality which allows mobility is welfare improving. Since the
two regions di¤er in their quality, the patient at the border between the high- and low-skill region
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is willing to travel further to obtain the extra quality of care. Therefore a decentralised system
with no mobility implies that the high-skill (low-skill) region treats too few (too many) patients.
It also implies too low quality in the high-skill region and too high quality in the low-skill region.
Since demand is higher (lower) for the high-skill (low-skill) region under the centralised solution, the
optimal quality is higher (lower). In the high-skill region patients are better o¤ under a centralised
system since they receive higher quality. In the low-skill region the e¤ect on patientsutility from
health gains is mixed: patients who travel from the low-skill to the high-skill region benet from
the higher quality provided in this region, but patients who stay in the low-skill region have lower
quality compared to a decentralised solution. Whether each region pays more or less taxes under a
centralised solution is in general indeterminate. However, we show that if the cost of quality provision
takes a quadratic form, health expenditures are higher in the high-skill region and it benets from
an implicit subsidy from the low-skill region so that the high-skill (low-skill) region is overall better
(worse) o¤ under centralisation.
The result that allowing mobility under a centralised solution is welfare improving does not
necessarily imply that it is welfare improving under a decentralised one. It however shows that it
has the potential to improve welfare. As we discuss below, whether mobility increases or reduces
welfare depends on the system of transfers between the di¤erent regions, which is at the core of the
EU discussion on how to regulate mobility.
Decentralisation with mobility versus decentralisation without mobility. Compared to a decen-
tralised system without mobility, allowing mobility without any form of transfers generates a race to
the bottomwith lower quality in both regions. This arises because the high-skill region has a lower
marginal benet from quality: higher quality attracts patients from the low-skill region, but does
not generate any revenues. The low-skill region also has poor incentives to increase quality: lower
quality shifts more patients to the high-skill region which reduces costs. An important implication is
therefore that allowing mobility within the EU without any form of transfer system is undesirable.
The comparison leads to di¤erent conclusions if a system of transfers is in place. Suppose that
the low-skill region pays a price equal to the marginal cost for every patient treated by the high-
skill region. In this case, decentralisation with mobility can generate a (weak) Pareto improvement
compared to decentralisation without mobility. The high-skill region is indi¤erent but the low-
skill region is better o¤. The high-skill region is indi¤erent because the marginal cost of treating
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the patients is exactly compensated by the price. The low-skill region benets because patients who
move to the high-skill region receive higher quality which in turn reduces the incentive of the low-skill
region to provide quality. This result implies that within the EU a price system can be introduced
which makes every country better o¤: countries that import patients can be compensated by an
adequate price and countries that export patients can benet from the higher quality.
A transfer system with a price equal to the marginal cost is generally not optimal. The optimal
price which maximises the sum of the regionswelfare is strictly above the marginal cost but does
not generate a Pareto improvement. The high-skill region now strictly gains thanks to the positive
revenues generated by mobility and the low-skill region loses due to the higher payments to the high-
skill region. Introducing such a transfer system may then be faced by stronger opposition. Within the
EU this result implies that although the optimal price should be set strictly above the marginal cost
to further encourage the high-skill regions to increase quality, this may be faced by the opposition of
low-skill regions.
The optimal price which maximises total welfare under a decentralised solution generates never-
theless a lower welfare than under a centralised solution (which coincides with the rst best). We
show that a more sophisticated transfer system which entails a price paid to the high-skill region
which is di¤erent from the price paid by the low-skill region does not lead to any further welfare
improvements. This result holds regardless of how the extra tax bill (due to di¤erent prices) is
shared between the two regions, and it arises because a marginal increase in the price paid to the
high-skill region or in the price paid by the low-skill region leads to a higher quality in both regions.
One implication of this result is that there is no need for the EU to develop a complex payment
system where the price paid by exporting countries is di¤erent from the importing ones, with price
di¤erences nanced through the EU budget. Instead a system with only one price is su¢ cient to
maximise welfare.
We believe our paper is the rst to study the impact of patient mobility on the provision and
nancing of health care across jurisdictions (regions or countries).5 In the health economics literature
there is a vast amount of papers studying the relationship between competition between health
5There is a paper by Petretto (2000) that looks at regionalisation of a National Health Service. It provides conditions
for establishing whether devolution for health care expenditure is desirable. Variations in health expenditure will
depend on its marginal benet and the marginal cost of public funds, including higher or lower transfers originating
from mobility. However, this paper has no explicit spatial dimension and it is not concerned with the quality of care.
It is thus very di¤erent from ours.
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care providers and their quality incentives.6 A main lesson from this literature is that competition
increases health care quality if prices are xed (above marginal costs) and providers are prot-
maximisers. However, if providers are altruistic (i.e., care about their patients), then the relationship
between competition and quality is generally ambiguous (Brekke, Siciliani and Straume, 2011). The
same result applies when providers also compete in prices, since then more competition depresses the
prot margin of the providers, which reduces the incentive for investing in quality.
Our paper has clear parallels to this literature, since we allow patients to demand care by a
competing health care provider in another region. We could also reinterpret the decentralised (cen-
tralised) solution as the competition (monopoly) solution. The question is then whether we simply
can transfer the results from the previous literature to an interjurisdictional setting.7 Our analysis
and results show that the answer is no. The quality incentives are determined by a trade-o¤ between
the marginal benet of higher quality and the marginal cost (which is the tax rate) to the patient. We
show that this trade-o¤ depends critically on the transfer payments applying to cross-border patient
ows, which in turn determine the regional welfare e¤ects of patient mobility. Thus, our analysis
provides novel insights into the provision of health care quality in an interjurisdictional setting.
Our paper also relates to the economic literature on scal federalism,8 in particular the part of
this literature concerned with cross-border shopping. The seminal work by Kanbur and Keen (1993)
provides a Hotelling model with two countries that di¤er in size (i.e., population density), where con-
sumers either buy the (private) product in their home country or travel to the neighbouring country
if the tax rate is signicantly low. There is free entry of rms, implying a rm at every consumers
doorstep. Assuming that governments are Leviathans, they show that the Nash equilibrium implies
that the small country sets a lower tax rate, inducing cross-border shopping from residents in the
large country. They also show that tax competition is harmful for both countries, in particular, when
the di¤erence in size is large, implying a scope for tax coordination policies.9
Cremer and Gahvari (2000), who study tax evasion and scal competition, modify the Kanbur-
Keen model by introducing a public good that is nanced through taxation on the private good.
6See Gaynor (2006) for an excellent review of the literature on competition and quality in health care markets.
7There is a paper by Aiura and Sanjo (2010) that uses a Hotelling model with two regions that di¤er in their
population density to study incentives for health care quality. While this paper shares some similarities in the demand
structure, the focus is very di¤erent as they study the impact of privatisation of local public hospitals.
8For excellent reviews of the literature on scal federalism, see Oates (1999, 2001).
9Similar results are derived by Trandel (1994), who assumes di¤erent population densities, Wang (1999), who
analyses the Stackelberg equilibrium, and Nielsen (2001), who assumes a transport cost on the commodities.
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They also assume that governments maximise welfare rather than being Leviathans. In this sense
the paper by Cremer and Gahvari is closer to ours. However, our paper di¤ers from the literature
on cross-border shopping despite some similarities. First, in our model cross-border shopping is
motivated by di¤erences in the quality of rather than the tax on the good. Taxation in our model
is based on the location of the consumer, not on the location of the product.10 Second, we assume the
private product to be publicly funded (through income taxation), implying an explicit link between
the tax rate and the provision of the private good. Thus, the incentives for increasing taxes in our
model are very di¤erent from those in Kanbur and Keen (1993), but in line with Cremer and Gahvari
(2000) if we ignore the possibility of tax evasion. Finally, we do not assume free entry of rms, but
rather assume that the good is not just publicly funded but also publicly provided. Considering
health care markets, we believe it is appropriate to restrict attention to a limited number of rms
(hospitals or physicians) rather than assuming that every consumer has a rm at its doorstep.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present our basic modelling
framework. In Sections 3 and 4 we derive the rst best and the centralised solutions, respectively.
In Section 5, we analyse the decentralised solution without patient mobility (Section 5.1) and with
patient mobility under di¤erent payment systems (Section 5.2). Finally, in Section 6 we present some
policy implications and concluding remarks.
2 Model
Consider a market for health care where consumers (patients) are uniformly distributed on a line
L = [0; 1]. The market consists of two di¤erent regions, which can be interpreted either as two
neighbouring countries or as two neighbouring regions within the same country. We will henceforth
refer to the two regions as Region 1 and Region 2. Consumers located on the line segment L1 = [0; 12 ]
belong to Region 1 while the remaining consumers, located on the line segment L2 = [12 ; 1], belong
to Region 2. The market is served by two health care providers (hospitals) which are located at the
endpoints of L; thus, the provider owned by Region 1 is located at 0 while the provider owned by
Region 2 is located at 1. Each patient demands one unit of health care (one treatment). We assume
10One can interpret this as an optimal (commodity) tax adjustment at the border; i.e., you are free to purchase the
good in any country you like, but you will need to pay the home country commodity tax rate when importingthe
good.
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that health care provision is publicly funded through general income taxation and is free at the point
of consumption. The utility of a patient who is located at xi 2 Li and is treated by the provider in
Region j, located at zj , is given by
U (xi; zj) =
8><>: y (1  ) + v + qj   t jxi   zj j if i = jy (1  ) + v + qj   t jxi   zj j   f if i 6= j ; (1)
where v > 0 is the patients gross utility of being treated, qj  q is the quality o¤ered by the provider
in Region j (with  > 0 measuring the marginal utility of quality), t is marginal travelling cost, y
is gross individual income and  > 0 is a proportional tax rate.11 The lower bound q represents the
lowest possible quality the providers can o¤er without being charged with malpractice and is, for
simplicity, normalised to 0. In addition to variable travelling costs, patients also face a xed cost
f > 0 of travelling outside their own region for treatment. We assume that there are two types of
patients: a fraction 1    of the patients have a prohibitively high value of f and will always seek
treatment from their local provider, while the remaining fraction  have a low value of f and will (if
allowed) travel to the neighbouring region if the quality of the treatment o¤ered there is su¢ ciently
high. For simplicity, we set f = 0 for the latter type of patients and assume that the fraction 
is constant at each point in L. Thus, we can interpret  as an exogenous measure of the degree of
interjurisdictional patient mobility. The total patient mass is normalised to 1.
If Region i faces a demand for Di treatments, the cost of providing these treatments with a quality
qi is given by
Ci = cDi +G (i; qi) ; (2)
where c > 0 is the marginal cost of treatment (for a given quality) and i is a positive parameter that
reects the cost of quality provision, where G (i; q) > (<)G (j ; q) and Gq (i; q) > (<)Gq (j ; q) for
all q  0, if i > (<) j .12 While the marginal treatment cost is assumed to be constant and equal
across the two regions, we assume that Region 1 has a superior technology for providing health care
quality; i.e., 1 < 2. We will therefore intermittently refer to Region 1 and Region 2 as the high-skill
11We may also think of  as the social insurance contribution set by the government.
12For simplicity, we assume that the marginal cost of quality provision is independent of treatment volume, implying
that quality is a public good for the patients of a hospital. This is a widely used assumption in the theoretical literature
on quality competition between health care providers (see, e.g., Lyon, 1999; Barros and Martinez-Giralt, 2002; Gravelle
and Sivey, 2010).
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and low-skill regions, respectively. Several of our results in the subsequent analysis will be derived
using the following quadratic form: G (i; qi) = i2 q
2
i .
3 The rst-best solution
As a benchmark for comparison, we start out by considering the rst-best solution, where a utilitarian
supraregional policy maker chooses the quality of each provider and also decides which patients are
treated by which provider. Thus, the rst-best outcome is given by the solution to the following
problem:
max
x;q1;q2
W = y(1  ) + 
0@ xZ
0
(v + q1   ts) ds+
1Z
x
(v + q2   t (1  s)) ds
1A
+(1  )
0B@
1
2Z
0
(v + q1   ts) ds+
1Z
1
2
(v + q2   t (1  s)) ds
1CA (3)
subject to the budget constraint
y = c+G(1; q1) +G(2; q2): (4)
Substituting the budget constraint into the objective function and maximising, yields the following
rst-order conditions: 
qfb1

:

2
h
1 + 

2xfb   1
i
= Gq1

1; q
fb
1

; (5)

qfb2

:

2
h
1  

2xfb   1
i
= Gq2

2; q
fb
2

; (6)
where
xfb =
1
2

1 +

t

qfb1   qfb2

: (7)
By substituting for xfb, the rst-order conditions for rst-best quality provision can be written as

qfb1

:

2

1 +

t

qfb1   qfb2

= Gq1

1; q
fb
1

; (8)

qfb2

:

2

1  
t

qfb1   qfb2

= Gq2

2; q
fb
2

: (9)
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In each region, quality of health care should be provided until the point where the marginal benet
is equal to the marginal cost. Since Gq1 < Gq2 for q1 = q2, the rst-best quality is higher in Region
1 than in Region 2, which implies that a higher number of patients are treated in Region 1 in the
rst-best solution. The di¤erences in quality levels and treatment volumes increase with the degree
of patient mobility (). With quadratic quality costs, the rst-best outcome is explicitly given by13
xfb =
1
2
+
2 (2   1)
2
 
2t12   2 (1 + 2)
 ; (10)
qfb1 =

 
t2   2

2t12   2 (1 + 2)
; (11)
qfb2 =

 
t1   2

2t12   2 (1 + 2)
; (12)
which implies that the interregional patient ow (from Region 2 to Region 1) in the rst-best outcome
is given by 
 
xfb   12

= 
2(2 1)
2(2t12 2(1+2)) > 0.
4 The centralised solution
Now suppose that the two regions belong to the same health care jurisdiction, so that the quality of
health care in each region is decided by a utilitarian central policy maker as in the previous section,
but patients are free to choose their preferred provider (instead of being allocated by the central
policy maker). Since patients do not pay for health care directly, the individual (among the mobile
patients) who is indi¤erent between the provider in Region 1 and the provider in Region 2 is located
at bx, implicitly given by
y(1  ) + v + qi   tbx = y(1  ) + v + qj   t(1  bx);
which yields
bx = 1
2

1 +

t
(q1   q2)

: (13)
13The second-order conditions are satised if the matrix
2664
@2W
@x2
@2W
@q1@x
@2W
@q2@x
@2W
@q1@x
@2W
@q21
@2W
@q1@q2
@2W
@q2@x
@2W
@q1@q2
@2W
@q22
3775 =
24  2t     1 0
  0  2
35 is
negative denite, which requires 2ti > ()
2, i = 1; 2, and 2t12 > 2 (1 + 2).
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The optimisation problem of the policy maker is now
max
q1;q2
W = y (1  ) + 
 Z bx
0
(v + q1   ts) ds+
Z 1
bx (v + q2   t (1  s)) ds
!
+(1  )
0B@
1
2Z
0
(v + q1   ts) ds+
1Z
1
2
(v + q2   t (1  s)) ds
1CA (14)
subject to (4). Let the optimal quality levels be denoted by qci , i = 1; 2. It is straightforward to
show that the rst-order conditions for this problem coincide with the ones that secure the rst-best
outcome, i.e., (8)-(9), implying qci = q
fb
i , i = 1; 2.
14 By comparing (7) and (13), we see that qci = q
fb
i
also implies bx (qc1; qc2) = xfb. Thus, the centralised solution also achieves the rst-best allocation of
treated patients across the two regions.
Proposition 1 The optimal quality and number patients treated in each region under the centralised
solution coincide with the rst-best outcome, implying higher quality in the high-skill than the low-skill
region and (some) patients travelling from the low-skill to the high-skill region.
Under the assumption of a uniform tax rate  , implying that the tax bill is split evenly between
tax payers in the two regions, regional welfare under the centralised solution can be written as
W c1 =
1
2
y

1   fb

+
1
2

v + qfb1

  t
8
; (15)
W c2 =W
c
1   

qfb1   qfb2
1
2
  

xfb   1
2

  t

xfb   1
2
2
: (16)
where  fb = [c + G(1; q
fb
1 ) + G(2; q
fb
2 )]=y: Thus, welfare is higher in the region that provides the
higher level of quality (i.e., Region 1). There are two sources of this regional welfare di¤erence: rst,
patients who are not treated in Region 1 su¤er a utility loss from the lower quality level in Region 2,
14The second-order conditions are
2
2t
 Gq1q1 (1; q1) < 0;
2
2t
 Gq2q2 (2; q2) < 0
and
2t [Gq1q1 (1; q1)Gq2q2 (2; q2)]  2 [Gq1q1 (1; q1) +Gq2q2 (2; q2)] > 0:
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and, second, patients who travel from Region 2 to Region 1 to enjoy the higher quality level still su¤er
a utility loss due to higher travelling costs. These two welfare losses are captured by, respectively,
the second and third terms on the right-hand side of (16).
5 Decentralised health care provision
Suppose that the two regions belong to di¤erent jurisdictions. In each region, the optimal quality of
health care is chosen to maximise the utility of patients living in that region (regardless of where they
are treated), and the cost of health care provision in Region i is nanced by a proportional income
tax  i levied on the regions tax payers. We will compare two environments where interregional
patient mobility is allowed or not, starting with the latter case.
5.1 No patient mobility across jurisdictions
If patients are not allowed to seek treatment in another region, the optimisation problem of the policy
maker in Region i is given by
max
qi
Wi =
y
2
(1   i) +
Z 1
2
0
(v + qi   ts) ds; (17)
subject to
 iy
2
=
c
2
+G (i; qi) : (18)
The rst-order condition for optimal quality provision under no mobility, denoted qni , is

2
= Gqi (i; q
n
i ) : (19)
With decentralised health care provision, the quality of health care is still higher in Region 1 than
in Region 2, due to the superior health care technology in the former region. By comparing (19) and
(8)-(9), it is straightforward to verify that qn1 < q
fb
1 and q
n
2 > q
fb
2 . Keeping in mind that x
fb > 12 , we
make the following conclusion:
Proposition 2 Compared with the rst best solution, decentralisation without patient mobility is
sub-optimal. In the high-skill (low-skill) region too few (many) patients are treated and the quality
12
provided is too low (high).
Decentralisation without mobility is sub-optimal: the potentially mobile patients residing at the
border between Region 1 and Region 2 would be willing to travel to Region 1 to obtain higher quality
but are not allowed to do so, which in turn generates a welfare loss. In the absence of interregional
patient mobility, the potential gains from the technological advantage of Region 1 are not fully
exploited. In terms of aggregate utility across the two regions, it would have been more e¢ cient to
increase the quality di¤erence even further and let the (mobile) patients in Region 2 who are located
on the line segment [12 ; x
fb] travel to Region 1 for treatment. An implication of this ine¢ ciency is
that total health care expenditures are too high in Region 2 and too low in Region 1.
We know from Proposition 1 that the rst-best outcome can be implemented with centralised
decisions on health care quality and free patient choice. However, even though total welfare across
the two regions would be higher in a centralised solution, it is not necessarily the case that both
regions would individually benet from centralised policy making with interregional patient mobility.
Regional welfare in the decentralised solution without mobility is given by
Wni =
y
2
+
1
2

v + qni  
t
4

  c
2
 G (i; qni ) ; i = 1; 2: (20)
Whether Region 2 is better or worse o¤ under decentralisation depends on the sign of the following
expression:
Wn2  W c2 =
1
2


qn2   qfb2

  
2
4t

qfb1   qfb2
2  G (2; qn2 ) +

G

1; q
fb
1

+G

2; q
fb
2

2
: (21)
In a decentralised solution without patient mobility, immobile patients (with prohibitively high f)
and potentially mobile patients (with f = 0) who are located on [xfb; 1] enjoy a higher quality of
health care than they would have in the centralised solution. On the other hand, potentially mobile
patients located on [12 ; x
fb] are deprived of access to higher-quality health care in Region 1 in the
absence of patient mobility (since qn2 < q
fb
1 ). These two welfare e¤ects are represented by the rst
two terms in (21). In addition, the tax burden of residents in the two regions is generally di¤erent
in the two solutions, as shown by the nal two terms in (21). In the decentralised solution the cost
of health care provision in Region 2 is higher, but, on the other hand, the residents of Region 2 do
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not need to take part in nancing the higher health care costs of Region 1.
We can derive unambiguous regional welfare e¤ects with quadratic quality costs. In this case,
equilibrium qualities in the decentralised solution without patient mobility are given by
qni =

2i
; i = 1; 2: (22)
Using (15)-(16) and (20), Region 2 is better o¤ in the decentralised regime if
Wn2  W c2 = 2 (2   1)
 
2
 
2t12   2 (1 + 2)

+ 2t22
 
t1   2

82
 
2t12   2 (1 + 2)
2
!
> 0; (23)
which is true for all valid parameter congurations.15 Since centralised policy making with mobility
implements the rst-best outcome, but Region 2 prefers decentralised policy making without mobility,
then welfare in Region 1 must necessarily be higher in the centralised solution:16
Proposition 3 Compared with decentralisation without patient mobility, the high-skill (low-skill)
region is better (worse) o¤ under centralised policy-making with interregional patient mobility.
Thus, even if centralised policy making implements the rst-best outcome, the low-skill region
(Region 2) would not be willing to transfer authority to a central policy maker unless there is a
system of compensation (e.g., an interregional income transfer policy) in place.
Notice that Wn2   W c2 > 0 also for  = 0. Thus, even if allowing for patient mobility does
not actually lead to any outow of patients from Region 2 (which implies qni = q
fb
i ), this region is
still better o¤ under decentralised policy making. The reason is that, when health care is nanced
by uniform income taxation, tax payers in Region 2 must contribute to nancing the higher health
care expenditures in Region 1 in the centralised solution.17 If allowing for patient mobility leads to
an outow of patients from Region 2 in equilibrium (i.e.,  > 0), there are two additional welfare
e¤ects of centralisation for Region 2: (i) lower utility for the patients who are treated in Region
2 (since qfb2 < q
n
2 ), and (ii) higher utility for the patients who travel to Region 1 for treatment
(since qfb1 > q
n
2 ). We can show that the rst e¤ect dominates, implying that higher patient mobility
15Notice that the numerator in (23) is positive due to the second-order conditions and qc2  0.
16Since W c1 +W
c
2 > W
n
1 +W
n
2 and W
n
2 > W
c
2 it follows that W
c
1 > W
n
1 .
17Since the marginal cost of quality provision is lower in Region 1 than in Region 2, the corresponding higher quality
level in Region 1 implies that the total cost of qualty provision is also higher in this region. Although this result holds
for quadratic quality costs, it does not generalise to any convex cost function.
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increases the welfare loss of centralisation for the low-skill region, if the degree of patient mobility
(as measured by ) is su¢ ciently low to begin with.18
5.2 Interjurisdictional patient mobility
This section derives quality choices and (regional and total) welfare when patientsmobility is allowed
under four plausible scenarios: (i) no transfer system is in place; (ii) the transfer system sets the
price equal to the marginal cost; (iii) the transfer price is determined to maximise total welfare
(dened as the sum of regionsutility); (iv) the price paid by the exporting region is di¤erent from
the price received by the importing region. We then address the following key question: compared to
decentralisation without mobility, how does interjurisdictional patient mobility a¤ect quality choices
and regional welfare? We also compare qualities under decentralisation and mobility with the rst-
best ones.
Suppose that individuals are free to choose the health care provider they prefer, regardless of
whether the provider and the patient belong to the same health care jurisdiction. The two policy
makers are assumed to choose the quality of health care in their respective regions non-cooperatively.
Since Region 1 has a superior technology for providing health care quality, there will be an outow
of patients from the low-skill to the high-skill region in equilibrium. The size of this patient ow
is determined by the share of mobile patients () and the location of the indi¤erent patient among
these (bx). We assume that the health care provider in Region 1 cannot turn down patients who travel
from Region 2 to obtain treatment. How is the health care to these patients paid for? Suppose that
Region 2 pays a transfer to Region 1. We assume that this transfer takes the form of a price p for
each of its own residents who are treated in Region 1. We will rst derive the Nash equilibrium for
any given p, and subsequently explore the four plausible pricing rules outlined above.
Anticipating that bx > 12 in equilibrium, the optimisation problem of the policy maker in Region
1 is
max
q1
W1 =
y
2
(1  1) +
Z 1
2
0
(v + q1   ts) ds; (24)
subject to
1y
2
=
c
2
  (p  c)
bx  1
2

+G (1; q1) ; (25)
18 @(W
n
2  Wc2 )
@
=
t4(2 1)[4t212 2(1+2)2]
4(2t12 2(1+2))3
. This expression is always positive if  is su¢ ciently low.
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while the optimisation problem of Region 2 is
max
q2
W2 =
y
2
(1  2) + 
Z bx
1
2
(v + q1   ts) ds
+(1  )
Z bx
1
2
(v + q2   t (1  s)) ds+
Z 1
bx (v + q2   t (1  s)) ds; (26)
subject to
2y
2
=
c
2
+ (p  c)
bx  1
2

+G (2; q2) : (27)
Notice that the second term on the right-hand side of (25) represents the net revenue for Region 1 of
treating patients from the neighbouring region, while the second term on the right-hand side of (27)
represents the corresponding net cost for Region 2.
The rst-order conditions that dene the Nash equilibrium under decentralisation and patient
mobility, with equilibrium qualities denoted by qmi , i = 1; 2, are given by
19
(qm1 ) :

2

1 +

t
(p  c)

= Gq1 (1; q
m
1 ) ; (28)
(qm2 ) :

2

1 +

t
(p  c   (qm1   qm2 ))

= Gq2 (2; q
m
2 ) : (29)
In each region, the level of health care quality is chosen such that the marginal utility for the regions
residents plus the marginal net revenue from interregional patient ows are equal to the marginal
cost of quality provision. In equilibrium, the health care quality is always higher in Region 1 than in
Region 2, and the welfare in each region is given by
Wm1 =
y
2
+
1
2
(v + qm1 ) 
t
8
  1
2

c  
t
(qm1   qm2 ) (p  c)

 G (1; qm1 ) (30)
and
Wm2 =
y
2
+
1
2
(v + qm2 ) 
t
8
+ 
2
4t
(qm1   qm2 )2  
1
2

c+

t
(qm1   qm2 ) (p  c)

 G (2; qm2 ) : (31)
Before considering di¤erent rules for choosing p, let us rst see how equilibrium qualities depend
on the level of p. By totally di¤erentiating (28)-(29) and applying Cramers rule, we can show that
19The second-order conditions are  Gq1q1 < 0 and 
2
2t
 Gq2q2 < 0.
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the equilibrium quality responses to a marginal increase in the transfer payment p are given by
@qm1
@p
=

2tGq1q1 (1; q
m
1 )
> 0; (32)
@qm2
@p
=


Gq1q1 (1; q
m
1 )  
2
2t

2tGq1q1 (1; q
m
1 )

Gq2q2 (2; q
m
2 )  
2
2t
 > 0: (33)
Notice that the positive sign of @qm2 =@p is determined by invoking the second-order conditions of the
centralised optimisation problem. The intuition for the positive relationship between the transfer
payment and equilibrium qualities in the two regions is reasonably straightforward. An increase in p
makes it more protable for Region 1 to treat patients from Region 2, while it becomes more costly
for Region 2 to pay for the treatment of these patients. All else equal, this gives the policy maker in
Region 1 incentives to provide higher quality in order to attract more patients from the neighbouring
region, while the policy maker in Region 2 has an incentive to increase quality in order to dampen
the outow of patients. In other words, a higher transfer payment intensies quality competition
between the two regions. This e¤ect is stronger the higher the share of mobile patients () and the
lower the travelling costs (t). With quadratic quality costs, equilibrium qualities in the two regions
are given by
qm1 =
 (t+  (p  c))
2t1
; (34)
qm2 =

 
2t1   2

( (p  c) + t)
2t1
 
2t2   2
 : (35)
In the subsequent analysis, we investigate the four pricing rules mentioned at the beginning of
this section.
5.2.1 No transfer payment
Suppose that there is no system of transfer payment in place; i.e., p = 0. The Nash equilibrium is
then characterised by
(qm1 ) :

2

1  c
t

= Gq1 (1; q
m
1 ) ; (36)
(qm2 ) :

2

1  
t
(c+  (qm1   qm2 ))

= Gq2 (2; q
m
2 ) : (37)
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Comparing with the case of decentralisation without mobility, (19), we see that patient mobility leads
to lower health care quality in both regions: qm1 < q
n
1 and q
m
2 < q
n
2 : Since Region 1 is not compensated
for the treatment of patients from Region 2, the policy maker in Region 1 has an incentive to reduce
the quality in order to dampen the inow of such patients. At the same time, the policy maker in
Region 2 has an incentive to stimulate patient outow, by reducing quality, in order to pass some
of the regions health care expenditures on to the tax payers of Region 1. In other words, Region 2
has an incentive to free ride on the high-skilled Region 1s quality investments. Thus, allowing for
interjurisdictional patient mobility without transfer payments leads to a race to the bottomin terms
of health care quality. In fact, even if a transfer payment scheme is in place, a race-to-the-bottom
e¤ect is present albeit in a milder form for any price below marginal cost (p < c).
Compared with the rst-best outcome, there is clearly underprovision of quality in Region 1,
while the quality in Region 2 might be higher or lower than in the rst-best solution. With quadratic
quality costs, quality is underprovided also in Region 2 if
qfb2   qm2 = 
c
 
2t1   2
  
2t12   2 (1 + 2)
  t4 (2   1)
2t1
 
2t2   2
  
2t12   2 (1 + 2)
 > 0: (38)
This condition holds if the marginal treatment costs (c) is su¢ ciently high relative to the marginal
willingness-to-pay for quality (). The underprovision of quality in Region 1 also means that the
interregional patient ow is too small.20
How does patient mobility a¤ect regional welfare? For Region 1, the welfare e¤ect of allowing
interjurisdictional patient mobility is given by
Wm1  Wn1 =

2
(qm1   qn1 )  (G (1; qm1 ) G (1; qn1 )) 

2t
c (qm1   qm2 ) < 0: (39)
Welfare in Region 1 is lower with mobility for two reasons. First, the quality of health care goes
20The indi¤erent patient (among the mobile ones) is located at
bx (qm1 ; qm2 ) = t  2t12 + 2 (2   1)  2 (t1 + c (2   1))
2t1
 
2t2   2
 :
The comparison with the rst-best solution is given by
bx (qm1 ; qm2 )  xfb =  2 (2   1) c  2t12   2 (1 + 2)+ t22
2t1
 
2t2   2
  
2t12   2 (1 + 2)
 < 0:
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down. The ensuing welfare loss of this drop in quality is given by the sum of the two rst terms in
(39).21 Second, tax payers in Region 1 must pay for the treatment of patients travelling from Region
2, the cost of which is given by the third term.
For Region 2, the welfare e¤ect of patient mobility is a priori more ambiguous:
Wm2  Wn2 =

2
(qm2   qn2 )  (G (2; qm2 ) G (2; qn2 )) + 
2
4t
(qm1   qm2 )2 +

2t
c (qm1   qm2 ) : (40)
Mobility has three e¤ects on welfare in Region 2. First, quality goes down for the patients that are
treated within the region. Second, since the ranking of qm1 and q
n
2 is ambiguous, the patients who
take advantage of interregional mobility and seek treatment in Region 1 may enjoy higher or lower
quality.22 Third, the tax burden goes down since some of the health care expenditures are passed on
to Region 1 through interregional patient mobility. The sum of the rst and second e¤ect is given
by the sum of the three rst terms in (40), while the third e¤ect is given by the last term. Notice
that, if 1 ! 2, there is no interregional patient mobility in equilibrium and the second and third
e¤ect vanish, implying that Wm2  Wn2 < 0. Due to continuity, mobility will lead to lower welfare
in Region 2 also for a su¢ ciently small technology di¤erence (2   1) between the regions. With
quadratic quality costs, however, the ambiguity is resolved and mobility leads to a welfare reduction
for all valid parameter congurations:
Wm2  Wn2 =  
22
 
t2 (2   1) + c2
 
2t1   2
2
8t2212
 
2t2   2
2 < 0: (41)
Proposition 4 Under decentralisation, allowing for interjurisdictional patient mobility with p = 0
leads to lower quality and lower welfare in both regions. Compared with the rst-best outcome, quality
is always underprovided in the high-skill region and is also underprovided in the low-skill region if
marginal treatment costs are su¢ ciently high relative to the marginal utility of health care quality.
Proposition 4 makes a clear case against allowing mobility if a transfer system is not in place.
21Notice that

2
(qm1   qn1 )  (G (1; qm1 ) G (1; qn1 )) < 0
since qn1 maximises
q1
2
 G (1; q1).
22With quadratic quality costs, qm1 < q
n
2 if c >
t(2 1)
2
. In other words, if the technological di¤erence between the
regions is low relative to the marginal treatment cost, patient mobility leads to lower quality for all patients, including
those patients who travel from the low-skill region to obtain health care in the high-skill region.
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Under a decentralised solution with mobility, regions would have poor incentives to provide quality,
which leads to low welfare in both regions.
5.2.2 Transfer payment equal to marginal cost
Suppose that the transfer payment is set equal to marginal treatment costs; i.e., p = c. In this case,
the Nash equilibrium is characterised by
(qm1 ) :

2
= Gq1 (1; q
m
1 ) ; (42)
(qm2 ) :

2

1  
t
(qm1   qm2 )

= Gq2 (2; q
m
2 ) : (43)
For Region 1, since the transfer payment exactly covers the cost of treating patients from the other
region, the incentives to provide quality are una¤ected by whether interregional patient mobility is
allowed or not, so that qm1 = q
n
1 . The policy maker in Region 2, on the other hand, has an incentive
to reduce quality when interregional mobility is allowed. Since a fraction of the regions patients can
obtain health care of higher quality in the neighbouring region, the marginal welfare gain of quality
provision in Region 2 is lower, and regional welfare is thus maximised at a lower quality level, so that
qm2 < q
n
2 .
Since patient mobility with p = c does not a¤ect quality incentives in Region 1, equilibrium
quality in this region is underprovided relative to the rst-best solution: qm1 < q
fb
1 . In Region 2,
patient mobility reduces quality incentives and brings equilibrium quality closer to the rst-best level
in this region. However, comparing (9) and (43) we see that qm1 < q
fb
1 implies q
m
2 > q
fb
2 , which means
that quality is still overprovided in Region 2.
Due to unchanged incentives for quality provision, allowing for interregional patient mobility has
no e¤ect on welfare in Region 1, and Wm1 =W
n
1 . In Region 2, the e¤ect is indeterminate:
Wm2  Wn2 =
2
4t
(qm1   qm2 )2  

2
(qn2   qm2 ) + (G (2; qn2 ) G (2; qm2 )) : (44)
Mobility a¤ects di¤erent types of patients di¤erently. Some patients from Region 2 get access to
higher-quality health care in Region 1 (rst term), while the remaining patients in Region 2 experience
a drop in the quality of the health care they are o¤ered (second term) which implies a lower cost
20
of quality provision (third term). Figure 1 shows graphically how di¤erent groups of patients are
a¤ected: patients from Region 1 in area A are indi¤erent; patients from Region 2 in area B receive
a higher quality while patients in area C receive a lower one.
[Figure 1 about here]
Once more, we proceed to assuming quadratic quality costs, in which case the equilibrium is given
by
qm1 =

21
; (45)
qm2 =
2t1   3
1
 
4t2   22
 ; (46)
and the welfare e¤ect of mobility in Region 2 is
Wm2  Wn2 =
4 (2   1)2
8212
 
2t2   2
 > 0: (47)
Thus, the gain of the patients who get access to higher-quality care in Region 1 outweighs the loss
of the remaining patients who have to accept a quality degradation.
Proposition 5 Under decentralisation, allowing for interjurisdictional patient mobility with p = c
has no e¤ect on quality and welfare in the high-skill region, while quality goes down and welfare
goes up in the low-skill region. Compared with the rst-best outcome, quality is underprovided in the
high-skill region and overprovided in the low-skill region.
Proposition 5 suggests that under decentralisation with mobility a transfer system which sets
the price equal to the marginal treatment cost can generate a (weak) Pareto improvement compared
to decentralisation without mobility. The high-skill region is indi¤erent between mobility and no
mobility because the price covers the marginal cost of treating the patients. The low-skill region
benets since patients moving to the high-skill region receive higher quality, despite the reduction of
quality for the patients who do not move.
Since there are both winners and losers from mobility within the low-skill region, we can paint a
more detailed picture of the welfare e¤ects of mobility in this region by assessing the relative sizes
of these two groups of patients. Notice that, among the potentially mobile patients (with f = 0)
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in Region 2, a patient who is located to the left (right) of ex is better (worse) o¤ with than without
mobility, where ex is implicitly given by
qm1   tex  2G (2; qm2 ) = qn2   t (1  ex)  2G (2; qn2 ) : (48)
With quadratic quality costs, the location of the patient who is indi¤erent between mobility and no
mobility is given by
ex = 1
2
+
 
421t
 
2t2   2
  24 (2   1) (2   1)2
8
 
2t2   2
2
t212
: (49)
Since patients are uniformly distributed, with a mass of 12 in each region, the winners from mobility
outnumber the losers if

ex  1
2

>
1
4
:
It is reasonably straightforward to show that a necessary (but not su¢ cient) condition for this
inequality to hold is
 >
2t12
2 (22   1)
: (50)
This condition does not hold if there are su¢ ciently few potentially mobile patients, if travelling
costs are su¢ ciently high, or if the marginal utility of quality is su¢ ciently low, and it is less likely
to hold if the skill-di¤erence between the two regions is su¢ ciently low. Thus, even if mobility leads
to higher total welfare in the low-skill region, the losers from mobility will nevertheless outnumber
the winners if the condition given in (50) does not hold. One possible implication of this is that
the low-skill region could still block the implementation of patient mobility, if this decision is based
on a process that reects the relative number of winners and losers from the proposed policy (e.g.,
majority voting).
5.2.3 Optimal transfer payment
The optimal transfer payment for patients who seek treatment in a di¤erent region is a price p that
maximises total welfare in the two regions. Comparing rst-best quality provision with equilibrium
quality provision under decentralisation and patient mobility, i.e., comparing (8)-(9) with (28)-(29),
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we see that a price p = c+

qfb1   qfb2

will yield rst-best quality provision in Region 1 but overpro-
vision of quality in Region 2. Thus, the rst-best outcome cannot be implemented with decentralised
policy making. Since equilibrium quality provision in both regions is monotonically increasing in p,
the optimal transfer payment must thus necessarily imply underprovision (overprovision) of quality
in the high-skill (low-skill) region.
With quadratic quality costs, equilibrium quality provision under decentralisation and patient
mobility is given by (34)-(35). In order to nd the optimal transfer payment, we substitute these
equilibrium quality expressions into the regional welfare functions and maximise total welfare with
respect to p, yielding
p = c+
t2 (2   1)
(1 + 2)
 
2t1   2
 : (51)
A rst observation is that the optimal price is higher than marginal treatment costs. Thus, in order
to maximise total welfare, the high-skill region must earn a strictly positive (marginal) prot from
treating patients from the low-skill region. Notice also that a higher patient mobility () increases
the optimal price. Increased patient mobility implies that a larger number of patients in Region 2
are potentially willing to travel to Region 1 to obtain higher-quality treatment. In terms of total
welfare, this increases the marginal welfare gain of quality provision in Region 1. However, since this
extra welfare gain accrue to patients residing in Region 2, and the policy maker in Region 1 does
not take this gain into account, a higher payment for these patients is needed in order to provide the
correct incentives for quality provision in the high-skill region.
With optimal transfer payments, the quality provision in equilibrium is given by
qm1 = 
t (1 + 2)  2
(1 + 2)
 
2t1   2
 ; (52)
qm2 = 
t (1 + 2)  2
(1 + 2)
 
2t2   2
 : (53)
The e¤ects of patient mobility on health care provision in the two regions are given by
qm1   qn1 =
3 (2   1)
21 (1 + 2)
 
2t1   2
 > 0; (54)
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qm2   qn2 =  
3 (2   1)
22 (1 + 2)
 
2t2   2
 < 0: (55)
Thus, with optimal transfer payments, allowing for interjurisdictional patient mobility will increase
quality provision in the high-skill region and reduce quality provision in the low-skill region. Still,
compared with the rst-best outcome, there is overprovision (underprovision) in the former (latter)
region.
The regional welfare e¤ect of patient mobility turns out to be positive for Region 1:
Wm1  Wn1 = 4 (2   1)2
8t21 (1 + 2)  2
 
2t (41 + 2)  2

81 (1 + 2)
2  2t1   22  2t2   2 > 0: (56)
Although quality is provided at a level where the marginal benet for the patients living in Region 1
is lower than the marginal cost of quality provision, this is more than compensated for by the prot
that the region makes from treating patients that travel from Region 2.23
For Region 2, the welfare e¤ect of mobility is given by
Wm2  Wn2 = 4 (2   1)2
2
 
2t (2   21) + 2
  4t2 (2   1) (1 + 2)
82 (1 + 2)
2  2t1   22  2t2   2 < 0: (57)
Allowing for patient mobility implies that the quality o¤ered to the patients who are treated in
Region 2 goes down. In addition, the tax payers in Region 2 have to nance part of the health
care expenditures of the neighbouring region in the form of a transfer payment in excess of marginal
treatment costs for the patients who seek health care outside the region. The higher quality of care
enjoyed by these patients is not su¢ cient to fully compensate for the above mentioned welfare losses
and the welfare of Region 2 is consequently reduced as a result of interjurisdictional patient mobility
with optimal transfer payments.24
Proposition 6 Under decentralisation, allowing for interjurisdictional patient mobility with transfer
23The positive sign of Wm1  Wn1 is established by noticing that the numerator in (56) is monotonically increasing
in t :
@
 
8t21 (1 + 2)  2
 
2t (41 + 2)  2

@t
= 2
 
41
 
2t1   2

+ 2
 
8t1   2

> 0
Setting t at the lowest permissible value, t = 
2
21
, yields
8t21 (1 + 2)  2
 
2t (41 + 2)  2

= 24
2   1
1
> 0:
24The negative sign of Wm2  Wn2 is established by noticing that the numerator in (57) is monotonically decreasing
in t :
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payments that maximise total welfare leads to higher (lower) quality and welfare in the high-skill (low-
skill) region. Compared with the rst-best outcome, quality is underprovided in the high-skill region
and overprovided in the low-skill region.
In contrast to the result obtained in Proposition 5, allowing for mobility in a decentralised system
with transfer prices that maximise global welfare is not a Pareto improvement, despite generating an
overall increase in welfare. It is the low-skill region which will oppose mobility: despite the increase
in quality for the mobile patients, the price paid to the high-skill region is too high.
5.2.4 Transfer payments with two prices
The above analysis showed that the rst-best outcome cannot be implemented under a decentralised
regime with a single transfer price, even if this price is optimally chosen. In the following, we check
whether we can get closer to the rst-best solution by designing a transfer payment scheme with two
di¤erent prices. We show that we cannot.
Suppose that Region 2 pays p2, while Region 1 receives p1, for each patient from Region 2 seeking
treatment in Region 1. If p1 6= p2, what Region 2 pays is not equal to what Region 1 receives. If
p1 > p2, more tax revenues need to be raised; if p1 < p2, there is an extra surplus that can be
distributed to tax payers. Since the number of patients travelling from Region 2 to Region 1 to seek
treatment is 
 bx  12, the extra tax bill, in the case of p1 > p2, is (p1   p2)  bx  12. We assume
that tax payers in Region 1 pay a share  of this extra bill, while tax payers in Region 2 pay the
remaining share 1  .
With this new transfer payment scheme, the policy maker in Region 1 maximises (24) subject to
the new budget constraint
1y
2
= c

1
2
+
bx  1
2

+G (q1; 1)  p1
bx  1
2

+  (p1   p2)
bx  1
2

; (58)
@
 
2
 
2t (2   21) + 2
  4t2 (2   1) (1 + 2)
@t
=  2  2  4t2   2  21  2t1   2 < 0 for 1 < 2:
Setting t at the lowest permissible level, t = 
2
21
, yields
2
 
2t (2   21) + 2
  4t2 (2   1) (1 + 2) =  22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while the policy maker in Region 2 maximises (26) subject to
2y
2
=

(1  )
bx  1
2

+ 1  bx c+G (q2; 2)+p2bx  1
2

+(1  ) (p1   p2)
bx  1
2

: (59)
The rst-order conditions that dene the Nash equilibrium are
(qm1 ) :

2

1 +

t
((1  ) p1 + p2   c)

= Gq1 (1; q
m
1 ) ; (60)
(qm2 ) :

2

1 +

t
((1  ) p1 + p2   c   (qm1   qm2 ))

= Gq2 (2; q
m
2 ) : (61)
Comparing (28)-(29) with (60)-(61) we see that a transfer payment scheme with two di¤erent
prices cannot improve upon the equilibrium outcome with a single, optimally chosen, transfer price
p. For any pair of prices, (p1; p2), a uniform price p = (1  ) p1 + p2 yields exactly the same
outcome in terms of equilibrium qualities. This is true regardless of the value of , i.e., regardless of
how the extra tax bill is shared between the two regions.
The reason for this result is that both prices have a qualitatively similar impact on equilibrium
quality in both regions; more specically, an increase in either of the two prices leads to higher quality
in both regions. An increase in p1 has two e¤ects on quality incentives in Region 1. It increases both
the revenues from treating out-of-region patients and the extra tax revenues needed to nance the
transfer payment scheme. However, since the extra tax burden is shared between the two regions,
the rst e¤ect always dominates. For Region 2, an increase in p1 has only one e¤ect; it increases the
tax burden due to a higher cost of the transfer payment scheme and therefore gives an incentive to
provide higher quality in order to dampen the demand for out-of-region treatments.
An increase in p2 has qualitatively similar e¤ects. It becomes more costly for Region 2 to pay for
out-of-region treatments, but the tax burden also goes down since the cost of the transfer payment
system is reduced. However, since the gain from a lower tax burden is shared with tax payers in
Region 1, the rst e¤ect dominates and equilibrium quality goes up in Region 2. The same happens
in Region 1, since the indirect cost of treating out-of-region patients in the form of higher taxes to
nance the transfer payment scheme is reduced when p2 goes up.
Proposition 7 Under decentralisation, a transfer payment with two prices, where the price paid
by the low-skill region is di¤erent from the price received by the high-skill region, does not increase
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welfare compared to a transfer payment with one price.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have studied the impact of patient mobility on health care quality, health care
nancing (taxation) and social welfare. Our analysis has been motivated by the new EU legislation
that aims at stimulating patient mobility across EU member states, but the analysis applies also to
patient mobility within countries with separate regional jurisdictions, like in Canada, Italy or Sweden,
among others. To study the e¤ects of patient mobility, we made use of a Hotelling model with two
regions (countries) that di¤er in health care quality technology, patients that decide which region
to demand medical treatment, and policy makers that decide on the health care quality and income
taxation in their region. Based on this set up, we compared the decentralised solution without patient
mobility (the old system within the EU) with (i) the centralised solution with patient mobility (the
optimal system) and (ii) the decentralised solution with patient mobility (the new system within the
EU).
We rst showed that the centralised solution with patient mobility implements the rst best.
However, this case is not feasible for two reasons: rst, the low-skill region gets lower welfare compared
with the decentralised solution without patient mobility and is thus not willing to transfer authority to
an interregional policy maker (the EU). Second, the centralised solution implies that an interregional
policy maker (the EU) takes over the health care nancing directly, which is a highly unlikely scenario
at the moment.
We then analysed the decentralised solution with patient mobility under various transfer payment
schemes across the regions. The worst-casescenario is when there is no transfer payments, since
patient mobility then leads to a race-to-the-bottome¤ect in terms of health care quality, implying
lower welfare in both regions compared with no patient mobility. Thus, in absence of transfer
payments both regions will oppose patient mobility. This situation is likely to describe the current
EU situation with no clear payment rules and thus very low patient mobility.
The feasible-casescenario is when the transfer payment is set equal to the marginal treatment
cost. In this case we have a weak Pareto improvement, where the low-skill region benets from access
to treatment in the high-skill region, whereas the welfare in the high-skill region is unchanged since
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the provider is fully compensated for the extra treatment cost through the transfer payment. Notice,
however, that the scope for a weak Pareto improvement is dened at regional level. Despite the
low-skill region being overall better o¤ under this pricing system, we can identify a group of winners
and a group of losers: the winners belong to a subgroup of the patients who travel to the high-skill
region and benet from the higher quality (the ones living closer to the border), while the remaining
patients in Region 2 will lose from allowing mobility. If the group of losers is su¢ ciently large, a move
to a system with mobility where the price equals the marginal cost may be politically unsustainable
in the low-skill region despite the potential welfare improvement.
The best-casescenario is when the transfer price is set to maximise joint regional welfare. We
showed that the socially optimal transfer price is higher than the marginal treatment cost, and
brings the outcome closer to (but not at) the rst best. The high-skill region benets since health
care quality and welfare is higher, but the low-skill region loses because of the higher taxes needed to
nance the high-quality care to residents seeking care in the high-skill region. We also showed that
a more complex payment system, with di¤erent (optimal) prices to the two regions cannot solve the
problem. Thus, optimal transfer pricing is not a feasible scenario, since the low-skill region would
oppose patient mobility (unless there is an interregional income transfer system in place).
The policy implications that can be drawn from our analysis are two-fold. First, patient mobility
is benecial for global (interregional) welfare when regions di¤er in their health care quality. However,
patient mobility might reduce regional welfare because of the race-to-the-bottome¤ect in terms of
health care quality or the high income taxation that is needed to fund high-quality treatment to
patients travelling across regions. In a decentralised regime with separate jurisdictions, the scope for
patient mobility is reduced to the locus of situations that result in (weak) Pareto improvements for
the regions.
Second, the success of imposing patient mobility (like the new EU legislation) crucially depends
on the transfer payment system. In absence of any payments, the outcome is either no mobility, where
patients seeking cross-border care are denied access, or mobility with a race-to-the-bottome¤ect on
health care quality. In presence of a payment system, the transfer price needs to be su¢ ciently high,
so that the provider is compensated from the extra cost of treating patients from another region.
Otherwise, the provider would refuse to treat patients or reduce quality in order to lower demand
from mobile patients. However, the price cannot be too high either, as this would imply high tax
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rates to nance the high-quality treatment to patients demanding cross-border care.
The new EU legislation states that patients seeking care in another member state are entitled
to reimbursement covered by the health insurance plan in the patientshome country. However, the
design of the transfer payment system is not specied by the new EU law, but to a large extent left
to the member states to decide. Based on our study, we expect to see patient mobility occurring only
between countries with a (weakly) mutual benet from this trade of health care services. If the EU
is enforcing the rights for patients to obtain health care in another country, without establishing a
proper transfer payment system, the impact on health care quality and nancing might be detrimental
not just to regional welfare but also to global (interregional) welfare.
By way of conclusion, we would like to point out some limitations of our study. First, we focus
on patient mobility motivated by di¤erences in the health care quality across regions. While we
think this is a main motivation for (planned) cross-border health care demand, there might be other
sources as well. For instance, patients might travel to another country for treatments that are not
available in their home country. Notably, the new EU law says that the patients are not eligible to
reimbursement for treatments not covered by the health insurance plan in the home country, implying
that such treatments would have to be covered out-of-pocket. This kind of cross-border health care
demand has been in place for many years, but seems to be of limited scope according to the very low
gures of patient mobility. We have therefore not addressed this issue in our paper.
Second, we have assumed that the income level is the same across and within regions, and that
utility is linear in income (i.e., patients are risk neutral). As long as utility is linear in income,
allowing for regional di¤erences in income would not play any role for our analysis. The reason is
that patient mobility, as dened by the marginal patient, does not depend on di¤erences in income
levels. Notably, we could re-interpret the fraction of mobile (immobile) patients as the rich (poor)
patients, which are able (not able) to cover the cost of seeking care in another region. Mobility would
then be higher (lower), the higher (lower) the share of rich patient living in the low-skill region.
However, we nd this to be a rather trivial result. Introducing income di¤erences into the model
should be done in a more elaborate way, especially by allowing for utility to be concave in income
(i.e., risk-averse patients). We could also allow for di¤erent income distributions in the two regions.
While this could be an interesting study, it is well beyond the scope of the current paper and thus
left for future research.
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Figure 1. Effect of patients’ mobility when transfer  
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